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Executive Summary 
The Constitutional Affairs Committee is currently 
reviewing the European Parliament’s Rules of 
Procedure to increase the effectiveness, 
transparency and inclusiveness of first-reading 
agreements under co-decision. This CEPS Policy 
Brief takes a stand as to which rules should be 
adopted to achieve these objectives. Given the 
steep rise of early agreements and Parliament’s 
role as a guarantor of EU legitimacy, we place a 
premium on inclusiveness and transparency. The 
rules suggested are designed to maintain 
efficiency for technical proposals, facilitate 
effective decision-making on urgent files and 
increase the overall legitimacy of legislative 
decision-making in the EU.  
The Policy Brief makes a number of 
recommendations.  
To streamline the practice of co-legislation across 
committees, key parts of the Code of Conduct for 
Negotiating in the Context of the Ordinary 
Legislative Procedures  should be incorporated 
into Rule 70 of the Rules of Procedure.  
Committees should decide on a negotiation 
mandate, which should take the form of 
amendments to the legislative proposal. Based on 
the rapporteur’s reasoned opinion, the committee 
should vote on whether an early conclusion 
should be sought, and on whether the file, 
depending on its importance, should or should 
not be discussed in a plenary session (following 
the Council’s practice of classifying files as B or A 
points, respectively). If a first-reading agreement 
is attempted, the decision to open negotiations 
and the mandate should be passed on to 
committee chairs and presidents. On A points, the 
plenary should be informed; on B points – or at 
the plenary’s own request – the item should be 
debated, potentially amended and eventually 
voted on.  
After agreement on the mandate, the European 
Parliament’s team should take up negotiations in 
trilogue. Each political group should have the 
right to be represented on the team, led by the 
committee chair or one of the vice-chairs. The 
negotiation progress – and possible updates of 
the mandate by committee – should be traceable 
through systematic feedback and access to 
documents and reports. The committee would 
vote on the legislative compromise before passing 
it on to the plenary; before sending the European 
Parliament’s position to the Council, the plenary 
would then adopt the compromise or de facto 
reject it by adopting additional amendments.  
Accordingly, the efficiency gains of first-reading 
agreements would be preserved for technical 
dossiers, and swift adoption made possible for 2 | OBHOLZER & REH 
 
political but urgent files. Yet political files – as B 
points – would end up twice on the plenary’s 
agenda, with one opportunity for substantive 
input and amendment of the draft text. 
Notwithstanding the absolute majority required 
at that stage, going to a second reading would 
therefore become more attractive.  
These suggestions would swing the power 
pendulum back to the plenary and ensure 
adequate inclusiveness and transparency, while 
safeguarding effectiveness. They strike a balance 
between the objectives set out by the Conference 
of Presidents without being too restrictive to be 
sustainable. By embracing these reforms, 
Members of the European Parliament would 
increase the quality of early agreements and the 
legitimacy of EU policy-making. 
Introduction 
In April 2011, then European Parliament (EP) 
President Jerzy Buzek invited the Constitutional 
Affairs Committee (AFCO) to review 
Parliament’s rules on co-legislating at a first 
reading under co-decision. The reform was to 
make “the procedures more effective, more 
transparent and more inclusive”.1 In 2009, 
Parliament had adopted Rule 70 of the Rules of 
Procedure and the Code of Conduct for 
Negotiating in the Context of the Ordinary 
Legislative Procedures as Annex XXI (then Annex 
XX) to bridge the tension between efficient 
negotiation and transparent lawmaking. A mere 
three years later, the rules are again up for 
debate.  
At a crucial stage in the debate, this Policy Brief 
critically assesses both the status quo and the 
suggested reforms against three benchmarks of 
legitimate decision-making: efficient lawmaking, 
transparent legislation, and visible and inclusive 
deliberation.2 Mindful of the EU’s need for 
                                                      
1 European Parliament, Committee on Constitutional 
Affairs,  Working Document on Revision of Rule 70 of 
Parliament’s Rules of Procedure on Interinstitutional 
Negotiations in Legislative Procedures, PE472.201v01.00, 14 
September 2011.  
2 The assessment is based on the proposals made in three 
AFCO documents: Working Document on Revision of Rule 
70 of Parliament’s Rules of Procedure on Interinstitutional 
Negotiations in Legislative Procedures (ibid.); the first Draft 
Report on Amendment of Rule 70 of Parliament’s Rules of 
Procedure on Interinstitutional Negotiations in Legislative 
effective policy responses, the brief places a 
premium on transparency and inclusiveness. 
These norms spurred the promotion of 
Parliament to a genuine co-legislator in 1993, and 
they should guide the rules and practice of 
legislative decision-making. If the routine use of 
early agreements continues, transparency and 
inclusiveness can only be protected through a 
tighter regulation of negotiations at the first 
reading. 
This Policy Brief thus calls for the following 
reforms:  
•  to enhance visibility, enforceability and 
consistent implementation, key provisions of 
the Code of Conduct should be incorporated 
into Rule 70, 
•  to strengthen transparency and accountability, 
political representation in trilogues and 
information flows between trilogues and 
committees must be guaranteed,  
•  to bolster the inclusiveness of decision-
making, the plenary should be involved in the 
decision to attempt an early agreement and in 
mandating the EP’s negotiating team and 
•  to preserve effectiveness, a distinction should 
be made between plenary involvement on 
political and on technical files.  
1. The current reform: Questions and 
stakes 
The current reform is taking place against the 
skyrocketing of first-reading agreements, 
increasing from 28% in the 5th EP to 77% in the 
present legislative term3 (Table 1). Early 
agreements4 promote efficiency and 
                                                                                          
Procedures, PE473.959v01-00, 27 October 2011; and the 
second Draft Report on Amendment of Rule 70 of 
Parliament’s Rules of Procedure on Interinstitutional 
Negotiations in Legislative Procedures, PE473.959v03-00, 8 
March 2012. 
3 For a comprehensive analysis, see Christine Reh, 
Adrienne Héritier, Edoardo Bressanelli and Christel 
Koop, “The Informal Politics of Legislation: Explaining 
Secluded Decision-Making in the European Union”, 
Comparative Political Studies, 2013, forthcoming 
(http://cps.sagepub.com/content/early/recent). 
4 Files adopted at an early second reading are also called 
‘early’. This brief focuses on first-reading agreements 
because of their sheer volume, and because early second-
reading agreements pose fewer democratic challenges: HOW TO NEGOTIATE UNDER CO-DECISION IN THE EU| 3 
 
interinstitutional compromise. More than 1,000 
acts have been adopted under co-decision since 
1999; the average length of time has gone down to 
19 months; and the EU has responded swiftly to 
urgent policy problems, including climate change 
and financial supervision. Yet, early agreements 
are negotiated before Parliament adopts its 
opinion at a first reading, and they rely on deals 
struck in trilogues behind closed doors. Actors 
within and outside Parliament have expressed 
concerns about the lack of transparency and open 
debate — as put most recently by EP President 
Martin Schulz in his inaugural speech: “If our 
Parliament is to become more visible, if greater 
attention is to be paid to its views, a rethink on 
the issue of first-reading agreements is also 
essential”.5  
Table 1. Co-decision files adopted in the 6th and 7th 
European Parliament  






























321 151 42  16  61  21  23  7  447  195 
(%)  72 77 9  8 14 11  5  4 100  100 
Duration  
(months) 
17 16  27 24 34 33  45  29  22  19 
* Until 14 March 2012. 
Source: EP website, “Conciliations and Codecision, Statistics 
on concluded codecision procedures (by signature 
date)” (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/code/ 
about/statistics_en.htm). 
Against this backdrop, Rule 70 and the Code of 
Conduct are now subject to review; their reform 
was launched by the Conference of Presidents 
(CoP), following input and analysis from 
                                                                                          
reliance on trilogues notwithstanding, they are debated 
and voted on in a plenary session at the first reading. 
5 See European Parliament, “Inaugural speech by Martin 
Schulz following his election as President of the European 
Parliament”,  Strasbourg, 17 January 2012 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/the-president/en/ 
press/press_release_speeches/speeches/sp-2012/sp-
2012-january/speeches-2012-january-1.html). For an early 
analysis, see Henry Farrell and Adrienne Héritier, The 
Invisible Transformation of Codecision: Problems of 
Democratic Legitimacy, SIEPS Report 7 (2003), SIEPS, 
Stockholm (http://www.sieps.se/sites/default/files/9-
20037.pdf). 
committee chairs and the secretaries-general of 
political groups. Triggers for reform include 
concerns about the inferior legal status of Annex 
XXI compared with Rule 70, contradictions 
between the two sets of rules and inconsistent 
implementation of the Code across parliamentary 
committees. Within Parliament, committees and 
rapporteurs seem empowered at the expense of 
political groups and the plenary; vis-à-vis the 
outside, visible political contestation is seen to be 
lacking where the plenary acts as a mere 
rubberstamp.  
AFCO began to debate the reforms in October 
2011. The need to incorporate (key elements) of 
the Code of Conduct into Rule 70 seems to be 
agreed. Such a move would be commendable. It 
would make the existing rules more enforceable 
as well as more visible within and outside 
Parliament.  
Yet, a number of challenges fuel continued 
controversy within and among political groups: 
first, the appropriate balance between efficient 
interinstitutional negotiation and transparent 
legislation; second, the potential reallocation of 
political power between parliamentary 
committees and the plenary; third, the tension 
between the rights of minorities and the majority 
within Parliament; and fourth, the repercussions 
for Parliament’s bargaining position vis-à-vis its 
co-legislators, the Council of the European Union 
and the European Commission.  
Whether the current reforms will be an exercise in 
tinkering or a watershed depends on the response 
to two key questions:  
•  What role should the plenary play in deciding 
to open negotiations at the first reading and in 
mandating the EP’s negotiating team?  
•  How can adequate representation in trilogues 
be guaranteed, and how can information about 
trilogue negotiations be obtained?  
2. Three benchmarks of legitimate 
decision-making  
In addressing these questions, this brief does not 
start from an a priori positive or negative 
assessment of first-reading agreements, but 
recognises their complexity.  
First, while concluded ‘early’, such agreements 
are not necessarily fast or ‘rushed’. Time limits do 4 | OBHOLZER & REH 
 
not apply at this stage, and research shows that 
the first readings of salient and contested early 
agreements take longer than those of similar files 
agreed at a later stage.6 This finding suggests that 
the analysis of important dossiers is not cut short. 
Second, while pre-negotiated behind closed 
doors, early agreements are debated publicly in 
committee and require a (simple) parliamentary 
majority for their adoption. Core standards of 
delegation and democratic representation are 
therefore met. Still, hinging upon agreement 
among the co-legislators before a first debate and 
vote in the plenary, early agreements do 
challenge key norms of parliamentary democracy: 
visible political contestation, the public 
justification of policy and transparency as a 
precondition for accountability. 
Given the co-legislators’ explicit commitment to 
early conclusion,7 these norms can only be 
protected by the tighter regulation of trilogue 
negotiations. Any such regulation has to balance 
the three benchmarks of legitimate decision-
making that underlie AFCO’s reform mandate: 
effectiveness, transparency and inclusiveness. 
Efficient lawmaking ‘delivers the goods’ and 
delivers them fast. Even so, policy goals can only 
be attained through effective implementation if 
speed is complemented by acceptability. Only 
then can efficient decision-making enhance the 
EU’s output legitimacy by responding to those 
pressing political, economic and social policy 
problems that member states cannot solve in 
isolation. 
Transparency  allows actors within and outside 
the EU institutions to follow the legislative 
process, through access either to the negotiations 
and/or records and documentation. Openness is 
not merely a virtue of parliamentary democracy; 
it is also a precondition for accountability. Only 
where stakeholders – citizens, civil society and 
national parliaments – can clearly identify the 
positions taken, can they assign responsibility for 
                                                      
6 Dimiter Toshkov and Anne Rasmussen, Time to Decide: 
The Effect of Early Agreements on Legislative Duration in the 
EU, European Integration Online Papers 2012, 
forthcoming.  
7 European Parliament, Council and Commission, Joint 
Declaration on Practical Arrangements for the Codecision 
Procedure, OJ C 145, 30.6.2007, pp. 5-9. 
legislative outputs, scrutinise the legislative 
process and hold the legislators to account. 
Inclusiveness allows for the representation of all 
interests within and outside the EU institutions in 
the legislative process. Inclusiveness also 
demands that policy proposals are publicly 
contested, deliberated and justified. As such, this 
norm underlies pluralist interest representation, 
minority rights and the accommodation of 
diversity; it also bolsters visibility and problem-
solving through the public consideration of all 
relevant arguments.  
First-reading trilogues enhance efficiency and 
problem-solving capacity. In the face of public 
concerns about the EU’s ability to deliver, this is 
commendable. At the same time, trilogues 
challenge transparency and inclusiveness: the 
circle of decision-makers is restricted; 
negotiations take place behind closed doors; 
documents are not readily available; and the 
plenary must rubberstamp the compromise 
between the EP and Council to allow conclusion 
at the first reading. Where trilogues are used, 
Parliament – the EU’s only directly elected 
institution – should uphold transparency and 
inclusiveness in its internal rules of co-legislation.  
The following discussion considers how the 
current reform proposals can contribute to this 
aim. 
3. How should first-reading agreements 
be struck?  
Clear and enforceable rules of co-legislation are 
imperative. Yet, reform is a tightrope walk to 
over-regulation, which could push actors into 
new informal arenas outside the reach of 
regulation. Thus, effective and sustainable rules 
must not constrain negotiators unduly.  
With this in mind, four critical issues structure 
the negotiation of a first-reading agreement: 
1)  opening negotiations with a view to a first-
reading agreement; 
2)  the negotiation mandate;  
3)  the composition of the negotiating team; and 
4)  feedback to committees, groups and the 
plenary. 
In taking up the reforms suggested below, 
Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) 
could (re-) structure political contestation so as to HOW TO NEGOTIATE UNDER CO-DECISION IN THE EU| 5 
 
make the EU’s legislative process more visible for 
citizens and to strengthen the legitimacy of 
supranational policy-making. 
3.1  Opening negotiations with a view to a 
first-reading agreement 
This issue pits supporters of first-reading 
agreements against their opponents: the higher 
the threshold for opening negotiations, the less 
attractive first-reading agreements become. 
Assessing the status quo 
Rule 2 of the Code of Conduct suggests that 
opening negotiations at the first reading “shall be 
a case-by-case decision”, “politically justified” 
either by the uncontroversial, technical content of 
the legislative proposal or by political 
circumstances, such as urgency and priorities. 
Following a presentation by the rapporteur, the 
committee shall take the decision.  
Practice differs across committees, and 
attempting an early conclusion is now a rule 
rather than an exception. Political justification 
suffers if a specific vote in full committee does not 
take place. Where negotiations start before the 
formal vote on a mandate, MEPs – and committee 
backbenchers in particular – can feel sidelined by 
the negotiating teams and by a rapporteur’s 
‘solos’.  
It is efficient not to consult or inform the plenary 
about the decision to attempt an early conclusion. 
Relatively shielded from close monitoring and 
media attention, negotiators can work ‘under the 
radar’ with greater flexibility. In contrast, 
consulting the plenary would cost time and 
resources. 
In terms of transparency, the Code’s criteria for 
the decision to attempt an early conclusion are 
unspecific. Where this decision is not debated and 
voted on consistently across committees, MEPs 
from small political groups need to invest scarce 
resources to obtain information about the 
decision and to follow each file.  
Inclusiveness depends on the case. Some 
committees are very consensual and inclusive. 
Yet, MEPs’ opportunities to voice their opinions 
should not vary across committees or depend on 
the goodwill of the negotiators. At present, MEPs 
are sometimes left in the dark on trilogues that 
have started, and the plenary is not systematically 
informed.  
Recommendations for reform 
Currently, efficiency clearly takes precedence 
over transparency and inclusiveness, although 
parliamentary decision-making should attach 
greater significance to the latter. This leads to the 
following recommendations: 
•  Committees are best placed to decide whether 
a first-reading agreement is desirable. Here, 
experts know for example whether an early 
agreement would be instrumental to facilitate 
a package deal. For the sake of transparency 
and inclusiveness, the rapporteur should 
clearly justify the quest for an early 
conclusion in committee, followed by a 
compulsory vote. This would incorporate 
Rule 2 of the Code of Conduct into the Rules 
of Procedure, but make public justification 
and a vote mandatory. 
•  Plenary involvement is a remedy only where 
the rapporteur, there too, justifies the 
decision. Involving the plenary without 
justification and debate would amount to 
mere symbolism. To safeguard efficiency, the 
plenary should thus be more narrowly 
involved: the President should simply 
announce the committee, rapporteur and file 
on which negotiations have started. This 
requirement should be complemented by a 
public registry of all the ongoing trilogues. 
While maintaining effectiveness, this reform 
would broaden information about ongoing 
negotiations and early agreements within and 
outside Parliament. 
•  Beyond information, the plenary should only 
be involved in highly political cases, where 
the decision to open negotiations should be 
coupled with a debate and the opportunity to 
amend the mandate. 
3.2  The negotiation mandate  
The mandate’s origin and form touches upon the 
key questions of delegation and control. Should 
the plenary have a prerogative to mandate 
Parliament’s negotiators in trilogue? 
 
 6 | OBHOLZER & REH 
 
Assessing the status quo 
According to Rule 70(2) a mandate, orientations 
or priorities should “in principle” be adopted by 
majority in committee. By contrast, Rule 4 of the 
Code of Conduct stipulates that amendments are 
adopted in a plenary session or by committee. 
Guidance without a vote is reserved for 
“exceptional” cases. This is a woolly set of rules, 
and accordingly, the mandating practice differs 
across committees. 
With few exceptions – including the financial 
supervision package, where plenary amendments 
were the basis for negotiations – the role for the 
plenary or indeed for political groups at the first 
reading is very limited. Both only approve or 
reject an agreement ex post. Where they choose to 
amend, the compromise between Parliament and 
Council breaks down, and the file cannot be 
adopted at the first reading. This implies a strong, 
intra-parliamentary power shift to the committee 
and its negotiators. Even at the committee level, 
rank-and-file MEPs are disadvantaged vis-à-vis 
the negotiating (shadow) rapporteur(s) and have 
trouble holding them to account. This problem is 
particularly acute where mandates are broad.  
The current practice is efficient. Loose mandates 
give negotiators flexibility, allowing for a 
compromise-oriented, problem-solving approach. 
A mandate in the form of amendments is more 
rigid, but could help focus the negotiations. 
Plenary involvement would cost time, not least 
owing to long intervals between sessions, while 
the Council can flexibly put items on the agenda 
of the frequent meetings of the Committee of 
Permanent Representatives (COREPER).  
Transparency calls for a clearly defined mandate 
that allows the negotiators, other MEPs and the 
public to assess outcomes against objectives. 
Detailed and specific debates on the issues at 
stake require that MEPs and political groups 
publicly justify their positions and priorities. This 
could ensure greater visibility and deliberation. 
As plenary debate in the case of a first-reading 
agreement often amounts to mutual backslapping 
rather than controversy about political 
differences, there is a serious transparency 
concern with potential repercussions for 
Euroscepticism: the absence of visible political 
differences facilitates blaming ‘Brussels’ and 
gives column inches and airtime to fringe groups.  
When it comes to inclusiveness, political groups 
and the plenary have limited input into the 
negotiations until a later stage, when, in the case 
of a first-reading agreement, the ship has already 
sailed. This makes the case for earlier plenary and 
thus groups’ involvement on politically salient 
proposals. In such instances, the plenary should 
be involved beyond being informed about the 
opening of negotiations (see above).  
Recommendations for reform 
First-reading agreements have shifted power 
towards committees. To increase inclusiveness 
and transparency, there needs to be a rebalancing 
by granting the plenary earlier influence over the 
negotiations. The key questions then become 
which files are debated in the plenary session, 
and who selects them. Given the inherently 
political nature of this decision, the most 
appropriate body would be the CoP. But other 
levels in the parliamentary hierarchy, such as the 
responsible committee, the Conference of 
Committee Chairs (CCC) and the plenary, will 
arguably seek to protect their turf.  
•  Mandates themselves should take the form of 
amendments rather than guidelines, allowing 
better monitoring by outside groups, as well 
as MEPs in and beyond the committee. This is 
a precondition for holding negotiators to 
account.  
•  We back a proposal launched in AFCO, 
mirroring the Council’s practice of classifying 
files as A or B points. B points are politically 
salient or sensitive files whose mandates need 
to be discussed further, ultimately in the 
plenary. As the file is passed through the 
hierarchy to the plenary, the CCC and CoP – 
and eventually the plenary itself – could 
recategorise it. The change would be 
transparent and justified. This would respect 
the authority of leadership, and safeguard the 
rights of associated committees (Rule 50, 
Rules of Procedure) and minorities. The 
procedure would align the co-legislators’ 
procedures; it would be inclusive and 
transparent but allow coping with a high 
workload efficiently.  
•  To ensure transparency, the plenary would be 
informed about all plans to start trilogues (A 
points). It would be more substantially HOW TO NEGOTIATE UNDER CO-DECISION IN THE EU| 7 
 
involved on B points. A points could be 
amended in order to recategorise them as B 
points for debate and substantive changes. 
The threshold for recategorisation and 
amendment should be equivalent to the 
current one at the first reading (i.e. a 
committee, a group or 40 MEPs). This at-
request-only involvement would strike a 
balance between minority rights and effective 
parliamentary conduct.  
•  It is crucial that plenary involvement should 
include debate and the possibility to amend 
the proposal. Plenary involvement is only a 
means to the ends of inclusiveness and 
accountability, and these ends can only be 
achieved if deliberation, contestation and thus 
visibility are facilitated. The closed vote on a 
mandate, as foreseen in Amendment 5 in the 
second Draft Report (see footnote 2), should be 
dropped, as it would result in the plenary 
rubberstamping many mandates without 
debate. Instead, a vote should always be 
coupled with a debate and the possibility for 
amendment (see Amendment 6, second Draft 
Report). 
In practice, this procedure dis-incentivises the use 
of first-reading agreements. Actors would be 
encouraged to refrain from early conclusion on 
politically sensitive files, and democratic 
accountability would be affirmed. Thus, it 
combines the best of all worlds: for urgent, but 
sensitive files, a first-reading agreement with 
plenary involvement would be possible, 
increasing legitimacy; for technical files, the 
present  modus vivendi would largely be upheld, 
ensuring efficiency; and finally, other politically 
controversial files would be pushed back to a 
second reading. 
3.3  The composition of the negotiating 
team  
Given the restriction and seclusion of trilogues, 
the question of representation goes to the core of 
democratic concerns about first-reading 
agreements. 
Assessing the status quo  
There is no provision on composition in Rule 70; 
according to Rule 3(1) of the Code of Conduct 
“[a]s a general principle, political balance shall be 
respected and all political groups shall be 
represented at least at staff level”. Trilogues have 
been broadened since 1999. Shadows and staff of 
political groups are mostly invited, and 
committee chairs often attend. Still, the 
composition of the negotiating team varies with 
files, committees, the rapporteur’s party, 
experience and trust, and the cohesiveness of the 
committee’s position.  
The current practice is efficient. Committees can 
tailor the negotiating team according to expertise, 
cohesiveness and interinstitutional contestation. 
Not all files require a representative (and hence a 
large) team; where the committee is consensual 
and where a file is uncontested, MEPs should use 
their resources more effectively. In addition, 
compromise is not necessarily facilitated by a 
large EP delegation, which can challenge coherent 
representation vis-à-vis the Council. 
In view of transparency, the status quo is 
problematic. Where the team’s composition varies 
between files and committees, it is difficult for 
actors within and outside Parliament to know 
who represents them in trilogue, to identify 
access points, to assign responsibility and to hold 
de facto decision-makers to account. This 
challenge is the more severe the more restricted 
the circle of MEPs briefed about the negotiation 
process and the more frequently this briefing 
takes place in camera (see below).  
Inclusiveness is not guaranteed. Where decisions 
are de facto taken in trilogue, only attendance in 
this forum can fully protect minority rights. This 
is particularly true for small political groups. 
They hold fewer rapporteurships, and lose a 
channel of influence where the plenary 
rubberstamps at the first reading. Yet where the 
mandate is clear and publicly debated (see 
above), and where regular and comprehensive 
feedback is given to the whole committee, the 
challenge to intra-parliamentary inclusiveness is 
less severe (see below). 
Recommendations for reform 
Accountability requires that trilogue negotiators 
can be scrutinised; inclusiveness demands that 
minority rights and open debate are protected. 
Attendance in trilogue should be regulated 
systematically rather than be determined ad hoc, 
and the EP’s negotiating team should be 
politically balanced.  8 | OBHOLZER & REH 
 
•  The restriction of trilogues is less problematic 
than the variation of their membership. A 
democratic legislative process needs visible 
and predictable chains of delegation. Rank-
and-file MEPs and the public must know who 
represents Parliament (and their interests) vis-
à-vis the Council at a first reading, and having 
to search this information anew for each case 
puts an undue strain on resources. A 
reformed Rule 70 should therefore clearly 
define the composition of the EP’s negotiating 
team.  
•  Coupling the decisions on composition and 
opening negotiations is flexible but 
insufficiently protects inclusiveness. Access 
and scrutiny are only guaranteed where all 
groups attend trilogues, at the level of 
coordinators, shadows or staff. Building on 
Rule 3 of the Code of Conduct, Rule 70 should 
mention “political balance”, un-hedged by 
formulations like “[a]s a general principle” or 
“as appropriate”. Yet to balance inclusiveness 
and an efficient use of resources, the rule 
should solely relate to invitation: groups 
should have the right, not the obligation, to be 
represented in trilogue.  
•  Leadership by the committee chair, as 
suggested in the second Draft Report (see 
footnote 2), would strengthen transparency 
further. Committees are the lynchpins at the 
first reading, and hence they should check 
trilogues. While the rapporteur should 
negotiate, the chair is best placed to represent 
the committee as a whole, and as such s/he 
should be tasked with leadership and 
reporting back. Given the volume of trilogues 
in co-decision committees, these tasks can be 
delegated to a vice-chair. 
3.4  Feedback to committees, groups and the 
plenary 
Trilogues take place behind closed doors. The 
questions of who is briefed about the negotiation 
and how therefore affect a core standard of 
democratic lawmaking: openness. 
Assessing the status quo  
Rule 70 has no provision on feedback; Rule 6(1) of 
the Code of Conduct prescribes that “[a]fter each 
trilogue, the negotiating team shall report back to 
the committee” and “make all texts distributed 
available”. Nevertheless, political groups, civil 
society and national parliaments are concerned 
about their ability to follow – and influence – the 
first readings.  
In practice, after each trilogue, feedback is given 
to shadow rapporteurs and the staff of political 
groups, often in writing. But often the full 
committee is briefed only after several rounds of 
negotiations. Depending on the sensitivity of 
information and time constraints, feedback is 
given to coordinators alone or it is offered in 
camera.  
This is commendably efficient. Restricted 
reporting is mandatory under time pressure; it is 
also necessary to preserve the discretion and trust 
required for the give-and-take between the 
Council and Parliament. Once briefed, shadows 
and coordinators can provide feedback to their 
groups, thereby assuring information flows. More 
limited feedback thus promotes agreement and 
saves parliamentary resources. 
Transparency raises concerns. A precondition for 
accountability, the ability to follow the legislative 
process is key in a parliamentary democracy. In 
the case of a first-reading agreement, committees 
finalise the legislative work without further 
amendment by groups or the plenary. To 
alleviate information asymmetries, to control 
negotiators and to scrutinise the legislative 
compromise, they must be informed about 
trilogues and have access to documentation.  
In view of inclusiveness, the current practice is 
equally problematic. Trilogues take place behind 
closed doors, and at the first reading the plenary 
mostly rubberstamps. The committee, therefore, 
is the only forum in which to express interests, 
advance arguments and provide public 
justification. This is not just a core demand of 
democratic lawmaking. The negotiating team’s 
mandate can only be updated on the basis of full 
information about the process.  
Recommendations for reform 
Co-decision was introduced to make EU 
legislation more open and visible, and thus access 
to information is paramount. If information 
cannot be obtained through physical access, then 
comprehensive feedback, which is consistent 
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•  To demonstrate that the EP takes openness 
seriously, and to signal the importance of 
information, access and scrutiny at all stages 
of the legislative procedure, Rule 70 should 
expressly regulate information flows from 
trilogues to committees. 
•  At the first reading, committees are key to 
check political power and provide 
deliberation. Feedback should be given to the 
full committee, and documents used in 
trilogues should be circulated. Briefing a 
restricted circle of a chair, shadows and 
coordinators is insufficient. To ensure 
transparency outside and within Parliament, a 
public registry of all trilogues should allow 
actors to keep track of negotiations, and 
reporting back should, wherever possible, 
take place in an open meeting rather than in 
camera. Effectiveness may call for discretion 
in an ongoing negotiation, but once an act is 
adopted, all documents should be publicly 
accessible. 
Feedback is a two-way process offering an 
opportunity to raise new arguments and to 
justify policy objectives. Guaranteed feedback 
therefore protects inclusive debate, and makes 
updates to the team’s mandate transparent 
within and outside Parliament – a 
precondition for the effective scrutiny of the 
legislative process. 
•  Given its key role at the first reading, the 
committee should debate and vote on any 
compromise reached between Parliament and 
Council. It should be the committee – not a 
restricted group of actors – that tables the 
compromise in the plenary session. 
Rubberstamping by the plenary at the first 
reading can only be justified where the full 
committee takes a public decision on the 
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